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Overview 
• The duty to disclose risks: 
– Re-visiting Rogers v Whitaker 
– Current law 
• Materiality and disclosure of risk 
• Causation 
 
• Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19 
 
• A critical reflection of the reasoning in Wallace 
– The underlying policy of the law in this area 
– How do patients make decisions? 
– A (brief) comparison to the approach in England 
Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58 
… a risk is material if, in the circumstance of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be 
likely to attach significance to it or if the medical 
practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that 
the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would 
be likely to attach significance to it. This duty is 
subject to the therapeutic privilege (at [16], 
emphasis added). 
Disclosure of risk: the context of the current 
framework 
• Despite a number of cases on the topic of risk 
disclosure in the healthcare context, the test 
formulated in Rogers is still in force 
 
• Recommendations of the Review of the Law of 
Negligence Report (the Ipp Report) 
– Qld, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 21 
– Tas, Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 21 
– n.b. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 50 
Establishing Causation in failure to warn 
cases 
• On establishing that a particular risk should have 
been provided, it is necessary to consider what 
the patient would have done if in fact, that risk 
had been disclosed: 
 
– Issues here associated with ‘hindsight bias’ 
(this is dealt with by civil liability legislation) 
Causation and civil liability legislation 
• Requirement to establish two distinct elements. For 
example, according to the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), s 5D: 
1. A determination that negligence caused particular 
harm comprises the following elements: 
a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of 
the occurrence of the harm (factual causation), 
and 
b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent 
person’s liability to extend to the harm so caused 
(scope of liability). 
The case of Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19 
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 - factual 
 
 - normative 
  On appeal: the appellant’s argument 
Although willing to run the lesser risk (neurapraxia), if warned of the 
risk of catastrophic paralysis the procedure would not have gone 
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Decision 
The decision of the NSW Court of Appeal 
• Both risks material; breach of duty in both respects. 
• Allsop P, and Basten J found that factual causation was 
established, but normative (legal) causation was not. 
• Beazley J (dissenting) observed: 
... the causation question has to be determined having 
regard to the content of the duty, namely a duty to warn 
of material risks. Accordingly, where there is more than 
one material risk, and a finding is made that a plaintiff 
would not have undergone surgery if warned of other 
material risks, it is difficult to see reasons in logic or 
policy why a negligent doctor should not be liable 
notwithstanding that a different risk eventuated. 
The decision of the High Court of Australia 
• Emphasised the test of materiality 
• Must prove that damage resulted from the failure 
to warn 
• When establishing causation, this must be dealt 
with according to the statutory test: 
– Factual (question of historical fact) 
– Normative (question of law: should 
responsibility for the harm rest with the 
defendant?) 
 
 
The decision of the High Court of Australia: the 
hurdle of establishing normative causation 
• “The policy of the law in imposing the duty on the negligent 
party will ordinarily be furthered by holding the negligent 
party liable for all harm that occurs in fact … if the harm was 
of a kind the risk of which it was the duty of the negligent 
party to use reasonable care and skill to avoid” (at [26]).  
 
• Liability turns on the question of the patient’s willingness to 
run the risk in question (at [36]). The policy of the law is not 
to protect the patient’s right to choose in a more general 
sense, nor to protect the patient from exposure to all 
unacceptable risks, but to protect the patient from sustaining 
physical injury for a risk “which is unacceptable to the patient” 
(at [36], emphasis added).  
 
Some problems with this approach? 
• Factually, the link between the failure to warn of 
both risks and the harm was established; this was 
not problematic for the NSWCA or HCA. 
• However, why should liability not rest with Dr Kam? 
– Does this represent a change in policy 
concerning the underlying purpose of the law in 
this area? 
– Does the reasoning adopted in Wallace 
represent the way in which patients make 
decisions about treatments involving multiple 
risks? 
Underlying policy of the law 
• In Chappel v Hart, Kirby J stated that: 
 
the requirement to warn patients about the risks of medical 
procedures is an important one conducive to respect for the integrity 
of the patient and better health care. In Australia it is a rigorous legal 
obligation (at [92]). 
 
• In the Ipp Report, it was observed that the finding of liability in 
Chappel was justified on the basis of the ‘responsibilities of 
doctors to their patients’, and that: 
 
the doctor should be liable because the risk that materialised was 
precisely the risk about which (in discharge of the reactive duty) he 
should have warned the patient (at 7.46, emphasis added). 
The approach under English law: a different 
focus? 
• In Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, Lord Steyn 
observed that: 
 
“Individuals have a right to make important medical 
decisions affecting their lives for themselves … not 
all rights are equally important. But a patient’s right 
to an appropriate warning from a surgeon when 
faced with surgery ought normatively to be 
regarded as an important right which must be given 
effective protection whenever possible.” 
Distinct and cumulative risks 
• Distinct risks: a point of significance in Wallace 
 
• Distinguishing cumulative risks: 
– Chappel v Hart 
– Rogers v Whitaker 
– Moyes v Lothian Health Board (UK decision) 
 
• Does this distinction fit with how patients make 
decisions? 
Processing risks in treatment decisions 
• According to Lord Caplan in Moyes v Lothian 
Health Board 1990 S.L.T. 444: 
 
The ordinary person who has to consider whether 
or not to have an operation is not interested in the 
exact pathological genesis of the various 
complications which can occur but rather in the 
nature and the extent of the risk (at 447). 
Benefits Risks 
Benefits Risks 
Benefits Risks 
Benefits Risks 
Concluding thoughts 
• Rogers v Whitaker outlined the basis of the duty of 
health care professionals to disclose risks to patients. 
• Causation has always been a hurdle in the context of 
cases concerning health professionals who fail to 
disclose risks to patients. 
• However, the approach adopted in Wallace v Kam 
seems to narrow the scope of these actions in 
Australia. This seems to conflict with: 
– The underlying purpose of the duty; and, 
– It fails to take account of how some patients may 
make decisions concerning medical procedures. 
 
Questions? 
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